Russia and China plan to double bilateral trade revenue by 2024, from the current $108 billion to $200 billion through projects in energy, industry, high-tech and agriculture. Today, Russia and China in general do not expect them to become direct security threats under their respective current political regimes. Vasily Kashin believes that some military planning is being carried out against each other, but conflicts are considered a low probability, which is only possible in the event of a very dramatic political change in one of the countries.37 Kashin notes that, despite the steady progress in the general political-economic relations between the two countries, the growth of their defense cooperation is due to the extreme technological nationalism of their countries. «In fact, technological nationalism seems more prevalent on both sides than in the Cold War era,» says Michael Kofman.38 Michael Kofman argues that «the problem for any future military alliance between the two states is that China is revisionist in the Asia-Pacific region, where Russia is a status quo power and it is the opposite of Europe.» Therefore, «they do not need security guarantees or an expanded nuclear deterrent, so there is no basis for a military alliance».39 Moscow could also attempt to maneuver between China and the United States, which would be reasonably better for Russia than staying on one side and is implicitly suggested by the primakov doctrine. which is admired by the current Russian elite in foreign policy. This position could be one of the main components of the multipolar international system, favored and encouraged by Moscow. However, strengthening relations with Beijing is currently the Kremlin`s priority, and it is not in Washington`s favor. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explains Moscow`s vision as follows: Xi and Putin argue for raising bilateral trade levels, an indicator that highlights progress and partnership, while obscuring how Russia has become more dependent on China. In 2006, Putin announced the goal of increasing bilateral trade to at least $60 billion by 2010. Trade growth stagnated from 2010 to 2015 before recovering. Instead of turning the page on investment, the BRI has been hit by old challenges. Joint lists of projects have been announced in the past and often win headlines, but in the end, few projects are provided.
In 2009, Hu Jintao and Dmitry Medvedev announced more than 200 joint projects. Five years later, less than 10 percent have actually increased.15 In 2014 and 2015, Russia created 20 special economic zones (CES) to attract foreign investment to its Far East. . . .